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
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5 August 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 5 AUGUST 1998 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you the attached letter from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister, dated 5 August 1998 setting out the essential facts concerning Iraq's implementation of the requirements of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and of resolution 715 (1991), and the attempts of the Special Commission to conceal those facts. Attached to the letter is a resolution of the Revolution Command Council and the Iraqi Regional Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party dated 5 August 1998 concerning the work of the Special Commission.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



Annex I

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 5 August 1998 from the Deputy Prime Minister of
Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to place before the Security Council the essential facts concerning the position with respect to the implementation of the requirements of section C of the Council's resolution 687 (1991) and of its resolution 715 (1991).

The Special Commission has been working for more than seven years in Iraq. Up to our most recent meeting with Mr. Richard Butler, Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, on 3 August 1998, the Special Commission had refused to inform the Security Council of the essential facts of the situation. Instead, the Special Commission had continued with its old and well-known methods of concentrating on details of no value with respect to the requirements of section C of resolution 687 (1991). It had also continued with its methods of obfuscation and misinformation by referring to marginal issues, and misleading the Council and world public opinion into thinking that those issues were of some importance with respect to the requirements of disarmament. In addition, it had attempted to conjure up the crises and provocations which characterized the work of the Special Commission throughout the past seven years. The purpose of this was entirely clear, namely to perpetuate the embargo in accordance with the policy of the United States of America.

At the latest meeting between the Chairman of the Special Commission and myself on 3 August 1998, after reviewing the results of what had been done since we last met on 13 and 14 June 1998, I addressed the following questions to Mr. Butler:

1. Are you prepared to inform the Security Council that Iraq has entirely disposed of all the weapons prohibited under resolution 687 (1991) in the three areas (missiles, chemical and biological), or have you tangible proof to the contrary?
2. Are you prepared to inform the Security Council that the factories, equipment and devices which the Special Commission regarded as being connected with weapons have been destroyed? And that the factories, sites, equipment and devices that remain, which are referred to as being of "dual use", are all being strictly and comprehensively monitored? And that, consequently, Iraq is not capable of resuming production of such weapons?
3. Are you prepared to inform the Security Council that the Special Commission, since the establishment of the monitoring regime in 1994, has not observed any serious violation by Iraq with respect to the resumption of the production of the prohibited weapons?

Mr. Butler replied that he was "not able" to say that to the Security Council.

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I asked him: "Why are you not able to do so? Are they not facts? In that case, why not notify them to the Security Council?" He said that it was because more verification was needed.

I said to him: "The Special Commission has carried out the following activities over seven years which are fully capable of verifying those facts. The activities are as follows:

1. The number of inspection teams that visited Iraq between 1991 and 2 August 1998 is 260.
2. The number of sites inspected and visited by the inspection teams and monitoring groups is 9,340.
3. The number of sites subject to permanent monitoring is 496.

The Executive Chairman of the Special Commission said that more verification was still required.

At our meeting on 3 August I reported the following facts concerning the so-called "verification" carried out by the Special Commission.

At the meetings that we had with Mr. Butler on 13 and 14 June 1998, we agreed to a schedule for work that would cover three areas (missiles, chemical weapons and biological weapons) and focus on outstanding disarmament issues, pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991), section C, with a view to resolving them in a definitive manner, so that the Security Council would be able to implement paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) within a short space of time. We also agreed to review the results of the work at our next meeting in August 1998.

What has happened in the intervening period?

I. Missiles

According to the Special Commission, there are two outstanding issues in this file: the material balance of the destroyed missile warheads, particularly the warheads containing chemical and biological agents, and final consideration of the status of indigenous production of engines and gyroscopes.

1. Re-excavation work at the sites where the destroyed warheads were buried in 1991 began in April 1998 and continued in an intensive manner until July 1998. This work was done, despite the fact that everyone knows that the missile warhead itself does not constitute a weapon, unless it is attached to a missile that is capable of carrying it to the target, and despite the fact that the Scud missile propellants and the missile launchers have been destroyed, as was verified by the Special Commission in August 1997. We worked with the Special Commission throughout this period to define the material balance of the warheads and we demonstrated our full commitment to removing all obstacles to the closure of this file, so that the entire matter may officially proceed from the disarmament stage to the monitoring stage.

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In the meeting between the Iraqi side, led by Lieutenant General Engineer Amer Mohammed Rashid, and the Special Commission, headed by Mr. Nikita Smidovich, in July on this issue, the Iraqi side provided substantive details about the complete material balance of the destroyed special warheads and the Special Commission team raised no objections about our conclusions.

However, rather than acknowledge this fact, taking it to be the last stage in the closure of the file, the Special Commission team, headed by Mr. Nikita Smidovich, raised a number of trivial matters, which were not germane to the basic issue, asking several questions as an excuse for further verification!!! We have included in appendix I to our present letter a list of the questions which the Special Commission team raised.

2. The second outstanding issue relating to missiles, according to the Special Commission, is indigenous production of engines and gyroscopes. A meeting was held on this subject in July 1998, in accordance with the schedule for work, with the Iraqi side being led by Lieutenant General Engineer Amer Mohammed Rashid and the Special Commission team by Mr. John Laraby.

As a background to this subject, I should like to state that Iraq attempted before 1991 to produce missiles through indigenous efforts. The Special Commission was informed after 1995 in a long series of meetings of the basic facts of the matter, to the effect that Iraq had not fully succeeded in producing indigenous engines or gyroscopes. One of the facts that bear this out is that, during the military operations between 17 January and 28 February 1991, Iraq did not use any missiles other than advanced Scuds. However, the Special Commission persisted with its so-called "verification". After three years of these verification activities, we thought we had laid this question to rest in a meeting in July, held in the context of the work schedule we had agreed on with Mr. Butler in June.

In the meeting, the Iraqi side established the basic facts concerning the lack of success in attempts to produce rocket engines and guidance systems (gyroscopes) locally. The Special Commission team, under the leadership of John Laraby, was unable to refute the Iraqi statements. However, instead of taking a decision on this fact and focusing on it, the team brought up - under cover of increased verification - marginal issues. As a glaring example of that, one member of the team raised questions, and the team leader, John Laraby, confirmed that they were important for verification purposes. Yet the questions concerned the import of a turbo pump for a rocket engine. Appendix II to our letter lists those questions.

II. The chemical area

The points that needed to be followed up in this area under the joint work programme agreed on in June 1998 were the following:

1. The results of the chemical analysis of the samples of the remaining warheads and the other samples taken at the installation Al-Muthanna Al-Ammah. Additional samples were taken by the Special Commission from the soil and the remaining warheads from the destruction sites.

2. The material balance of the special ammunition:

- The 155-mm mustard-gas projectiles that were lost;
- The R400 aerial shells.

3. The material balance of the equipment for the production of chemical weapons, and the presentation by Iraq of clarifications concerning the transport of glass containers of material for production of chemicals.

The results of the meeting held in July, which was chaired on the Iraqi side by the team of Dr. Amir Al-Sa'di, and on the Special Commission side, by Mr. Ivor Matrukhin, were as follows:

1. The Iraqi side demonstrated that the material balance of the R400 shells was complete and that the shell could be used only in combination with an additional part, and that these parts existed, and could be verified. Yet the Special Commission team postponed immediate verification until a later date!
2. As to the 155-mm shells that were lost, the Special Commission was informed of the results of the verification carried out by the Iraqi side, to the effect that, during the war or during the disturbances of March 1991, a shipment containing this type of shell was set on fire. A Special Commission team visited the site where the shipment was destroyed, and the results clearly proved that fact. In addition, the Special Commission team visited the extensive site where the remains of various materials had been buried, believing it to be the site where the remains of those shells had been buried.

It was explained to the Special Commission that this question could not constitute an obstacle to closing the chemical file from the standpoint of disarmament. It is one of the issues that can be followed up in the context of the monitoring phase, since the basic facts of this matter are:

(a) The Special Commission closed the chemical file in 1995, without postponing this issue, for a well-known reason: the material in question constituted less than 5 per cent of this type of material verified by the Special Commission during the destruction, or destroyed by it directly.

(b) The material in question was destroyed by fire, and we informed the Special Commission of the place where it had been burnt and the circumstances of the destruction.

In the light of the foregoing, this issue does not constitute a serious obstacle to closing the chemical file from the disarmament standpoint. This issue and other secondary issues can be followed up in the context of the monitoring phase. However, the Chairman of the Special Commission refused to do so and requested increased verifications!

(c) The Special Commission stormily announced that it had found the remains of the VX agent in some of the missile warheads destroyed, knowing that Iraq had repeatedly declared that it had not armed the missile warheads with that agent. This matter is reported to the Executive Chairman as follows:

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- (i) If Iraq had armed warheads with the VX agent, there is no reason why it should not declare this publicly, particularly as it has already disclosed that it armed missile heads with other chemical and biological materials.
- (ii) It would make no sense for Iraq not to disclose its arming of warheads with the VX agent, in an attempt to conceal them. A missile head does not, in and of itself, constitute a weapon, as we have already stated, but needs a missile to carry it.
- (iii) If we had deliberately failed to disclose this fact for the purposes of concealment, how could traces of these warheads have been found in the destruction sites?

All these points demonstrate that there are one or more other reasons which may explain why the Special Commission claims to have discovered, in the warheads of destroyed missiles, traces of decomposed chemical substances which could be elements of the VX agent. The traces which were discovered could result from the decomposition of other chemical substances or from the use of equipment which had already been used to produce the VX agent to place other substances in missile warheads. At all events, this is a purely scientific question which can be settled by the experts. I would add that the final result will change nothing as to substance, since the chemical weapons have been destroyed and the monitoring activities are ensuring that we are not manufacturing any new weapons. I have asked Mr. Butler to recognize these facts, but he has refused to do so.

III. Biological weapons file

Since 1996, the Special Commission has been engaged in distorting reality with regard to the biological weapons programme. It has deliberately concealed essential facts concerning this programme and spread lies and rumours in coordination with United States services.

The essential facts concerning this programme are as follows:

1. The programme was newly established. Its planning was not complete and it lacked the necessary personnel and expertise, particularly in respect of weapons. Because of the lack of specialized senior personnel, it had not become operational.
2. The equipment used in the context of the programme could not produce biological agents, and Iraq was not able to import the necessary equipment for this purpose.
3. Iraq completely dismantled the programme in 1991.
4. All the details concerning this programme were communicated to the Special Commission in September 1995.
5. For three years, the Special Commission has carried out innumerable inspections and organized a large number of meetings in order to verify Iraq's

declarations. Forty-five teams of biological weapons experts inspected 334 sites, and 13 of them met 256 persons. The monitoring teams of biological weapons experts carried out 1,048 inspections during this period.

6. A material balance of missile warheads which had been filled with biological agents and R400 air missile shells was drawn up.

7. All the factories were destroyed, and also a large number of items of equipment which, according to the Special Commission, had been used in the programme, although some of these factories had been established after 1991 for strictly civilian purposes. The operations of destruction, motivated by a spirit of vengeance, were carried out on a large scale. At the Al-Hokm factory, for example, not only industrial equipment, but also furniture, offices, cooling equipment, refrigerators, electrical transformers and scientific manuals were destroyed. We accepted this sacrifice after the Special Commission promised us that the destruction of Al-Hokm in that manner was the most important stage in closing the biological weapons file.

8. Some very important documents substantiating Iraq's statements have been provided to the Special Commission.

9. The Special Commission has carried out inspections for more than seven years. It has not found any biological weapon or agent, even though its teams have used very advanced scientific methods to detect any sign of past or ongoing biological activity at the sites inspected. Moreover, the Special Commission has not been able to prove the existence of past or ongoing biological activities at the sites which were not declared by Iraq, which have been destroyed.

10. The Special Commission has affirmed that 95 sites could be used for biological activities. These sites are under permanent, total and very strict surveillance.

Despite all these essential facts, the Special Commission is refusing to recognize the truth of the Iraqi statements. It affirms that these statements cannot be verified, although it has been engaged in this task for over three years.

On 5 November 1997, during a meeting with the delegation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, led by Mr. Al-Akhdar Al-Ibrahimi, we gave examples of verification procedures which the person in charge of the biological weapons file, Mr. Spertzel, adopted during the previous period. These examples were viewed with surprise and irony.

We agreed, with Mr. Butler, to hold meetings in which international experts would participate in order to consider this file, but this is what happened:

(a) The Special Commission insisted that the meeting should be held at Vienna instead of Baghdad, which prevented all the Iraqi experts who are familiar with the file from attending the meeting for reasons associated with the embargo;

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(b) The Special Commission had lengthy meetings with the experts beforehand and explained to them the aspects it considered to be negative, without giving the Iraqi side an opportunity to do the same.

(c) The Special Commission drew up a timetable for the work of the meeting, formulated the questions and determined the way in which the meeting would take place. Many questions were tendentious and political and had nothing to do with disarmament. That was why at the meeting which took place in Vienna, from 20 to 27 March 1998, it was not possible to resolve the problem posed by this file. When I met Mr. Butler in June, I therefore proposed to him that we should organize another meeting in Baghdad in order to study the file in an in-depth and objective manner. We decided that the meeting would be concerned essentially with fundamental issues, in other words weapons, filling and individual destruction, and then production and growth media.

During the meeting, held in Baghdad in July 1998, we were surprised to note that the delegation from the Special Commission was not focusing on the priority issues relating to disarmament, as agreed with Mr. Butler. As the Special Commission had done before, the delegation raised questions which bore no relation to the fundamental questions concerning disarmament. Little attention was paid to the experts, who were present to give a scientific and technical evaluation of what Iraq had produced in terms of biological weapons and the effectiveness of such weapons in the event that the material balance of some of them showed a slight deficit.

To resolve this question, I was obliged to meet the head of the delegation, Mr. Soelström, who asked to be accompanied by Mr. Spertzel, who is a United States national. The meeting therefore took place in the presence of Mr. Spertzel. I indicated to Mr. Soelström that, during the work between his team and the Iraqi team, directed by the army corps general Mr. Amer Al-Sa'di, emphasis had not been placed on essential issues relating to disarmament, as agreed with Mr. Butler in June. He replied that he had not been given any instructions to that effect. On 3 August, I raised this question during my meeting with Mr. Butler. I asked him why he had not given any instructions following our agreement. He did not reply.

Thus we were in a sense going around in a kind of vicious circle created by the Special Commission with regard to this file. In a letter dated 23 July 1998, I proposed to Mr. Butler that, at our next meeting on 3 August, he and I should preside over a special meeting devoted to a review of this file in terms of two aspects, disarmament obligations, on the one hand, and evaluation of what had been achieved so far (see appendix III), on the other, but Mr. Butler rejected this proposal (see appendix IV).

These facts about what happened at the meeting between Mr. Butler and myself and on the method of work adopted by the Special Commission during the period from 14 June to 3 August 1998, when the Chairman of the Special Commission refused to follow up my legitimate request that the facts in question (pages 2 and 3) should be communicated to the Security Council, a refusal which the Special Commission could not justify by any concrete argument, raise a fundamental issue: what is the value of holding these meetings and of cooperation with the Chairman and the members of the Special Commission if the

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Chairman cannot, as he indicated, communicate to the Security Council the facts about these meetings and the work carried out jointly? What is the value of these meetings if the Special Commission is determined to continue to resort to these deliberate delaying tactics by mixing essential issues relating to disarmament and the obligations envisaged in section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on the one hand, and the often entirely secondary issues which it insists on raising?

We have raised the question of the working methods of the Special Commission in many letters which we have sent to you over the last few years, particularly during the last crisis, between the months of October 1997 and February 1998, and we brought up the issue on 5 November 1997 with the delegation sent by the Secretary-General and headed by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. We raised this issue again with the Secretary-General of the United Nations during the discussions we had with him on 22 and 23 February 1998. We brought up the issue again during our discussions with the members of the Security Council.

At all these meetings we also raised the fundamental issue of the composition of the Special Commission and the control exercised by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, which has repercussions on the inspection and verification methods and the drawing up of reports sent to the Security Council, with all that that entails in the way of political statements and false allegations which are hostile to Iraq to support the positions of the Special Commission and its methods of work.

Despite some measures taken in this respect, the appointment of new members to the office of the Special Commission in New York and the inclusion of experts from other countries which are permanent members of the Security Council in some inspection teams, the situation has not changed and the United States and United Kingdom members of the Special Commission are continuing to direct all its activities and define the directions of its work.

Considering that the United States of America and the United Kingdom have political objectives which are hostile to Iraq and are unrelated to the Security Council resolutions, the domination by these countries of the work of the Special Commission raises a fundamental problem.

Iraq, for its part, has fulfilled the obligations envisaged in the Security Council resolutions and cooperated with the Special Commission, to which it has supplied all the information and documents available to it and provided all the necessary explanations, but the Special Commission is not prepared to tell the truth by announcing that the main task entrusted to it in implementation of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) has been completed. This is an illegal, politically motivated stand which is not based on any scientific or technical foundation.

Moreover, even when the technical arguments militate in favour of the closure of a given file, the United States of America and the United Kingdom are opposed and, every time these two countries have an opportunity to use their right of veto, they obstruct any measure going in the direction of justice and equity which the Security Council might take. This is what happened in July in the case of the nuclear file, which proves that we are in a situation in which

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the embargo against Iraq is maintained whatever it does and whatever measures it takes.

The Iraqi leaders have warned against such a situation on various occasions, notably on 1 May 1998, in the address by the President of the Republic, on 17 July 1998, and finally in the latest communiqué issued on 30 July 1998, which was officially transmitted to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Despite this warning, the Special Commission did not follow up on the heartfelt appeal we made in the communiqué in question and persisted in its methods which are directed at maintaining the embargo to serve the criminal policy of the United States of America aimed at killing the Iraqi people and destroying Iraq. Our communiqué of 30 July 1998 clearly stated that this situation was unacceptable because Iraq cannot sustain all these losses, these expenses and these threats to its security and its sovereignty as long as the embargo remains in place.

It is for this reason that the Iraqi leaders took a number of decisions to preserve their legitimate national interests, put an end to the flagrant injustice being perpetrated against the great Iraqi people for many years, and make international public opinion aware of the serious turn of events and the nature of the injustice created and maintained by the United States of America.

The communiqué issued on 5 August 1998 by the Iraqi political leadership is annexed to this letter.

Iraq has cooperated with the Security Council, the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency and has fulfilled all its obligations in good faith to have the embargo imposed on its people lifted, but this spirit of cooperation and these measures have not led to a lifting of the embargo, which has been maintained unchanged for eight years. Thus, Iraq cannot continue to endure this injustice, and we hope that the Council will carefully consider, in all good faith, the decisions it has taken and the proposals it has made so as to put an end to iniquity and restore justice.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister

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Appendix I

[Original: English]

Examples of the questions raised by the United Nations
Special Commission

1. What is the type, weight, size and diameter of each bomb?
2. How many people lifted each bomb?
3. Was the excavator a shovel or Poclain?
4. Was it wheeled or truck?
5. Is it that one with the big arm?
6. Was it a big or small one?
7. How wide was the blade?
8. When you got to that site, what did it look like?
9. Was it flat, a valley or a hill?
10. Did you fill in the pits which were dug up?
11. How far did the fragments travel?
12. Where did you put the things (fragments) you collected?
13. Had the tyres of your vehicle been punctured?
14. Did you have any problem in arriving at the pits, such as punctured tyres?
15. Did you take a vehicle to that pit or did you walk?
16. Were the shovel and Poclain used in the same pits?
17. Were the piles (of the fragments) of the same size or was there one large and the others smaller?
18. Were the piles collected inside the pits or at the top of the pits?
19. Were things thrown from the top to the bottom of the pits?
20. Was your truck wheeled or truck?

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Appendix II

[Original: English]

Questions regarding the receiving of the foreign turbo-pump
for the test run on 13 September 1989

1. Who on the Iraqi side received the pump?
2. Who on the Iraqi side was also present?
3. Who handed over the pump (all persons)?
4. Who was asked to hand over the pump?
5. When did you ask to be given one pump beforehand?
6. Was this desire also expressed in writing?
7. When was the pump handed over (date)?
8. When was the pump built into the engine for testing?
9. Which airline was used to bring the pump to Iraq?
10. Which were the flight data?
11. Which airport in Iraq was used?
12. What were the packings for the pump?
13. Were the packings original Thyssen packings?
14. Was the packing of the pump different than for the other pumps?
15. How was the package labelled?
16. How was the pump brought through customs?
17. How was the pump transported from the airport to your facilities?
18. Where exactly (location) was the pump handed over?
19. Had the pump been tested in Germany before delivery?
20. Were there additional customs papers for the pump?
21. Who paid for the transport?
22. How much was paid for this transport?

23. Did the pump bear a serial number?
24. Were there any differences between this pump and the following pumps?
25. Is this pump to be considered additionally to the contracted 35 pumps?
26. If the first pump was brought in the autumn and three in January, what did the box, which was supposed to contain five pumps, really contain?
27. How long did the people who handed over the pump stay in Iraq?
28. Which airline did they use to go back; when did they leave Iraq (flight data)?
29. Anything to add?

Appendix III

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 23 July 1998 from the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq addressed to the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

With reference to the programme of our next meeting in Baghdad to be held from 3 to 4 August 1998, I should like to point out that the outcome of the meetings which were held in Baghdad from 17 to 22 July on the question of the biological file (Group 250) did not succeed in closing the gaps between the two sides. Therefore, we deem it highly important to devote sufficient time to this issue during our next meeting, in order to be able to study it intensively from the political and technical angles. This may require an extension of your stay in Baghdad for as long as necessary, and the participation of the largest possible number of experts from both sides in considering the issue in question during the next meeting.

We hope that you will attach high priority to this matter.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ
Deputy Prime Minister

Appendix IV

[Original: English]

Letter dated 24 July 1998 from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq

I write in response to your letter of 23 July 1998.

Your proposal rests on a basic contention that, in your words, "the outcome of the meetings ... did not succeed in closing the gaps between the two sides". Two points must be made about that contention.

First, I do not know in any authoritative way what the outcome was because I have not yet received the Chief Inspector's report. I am interested that it appears that you do.

Secondly, I have a problem with the notion of "gaps" between the two sides because it, fundamentally, misrepresents both the nature of the relationship, which, according to the Security Council, should prevail between the United Nations Special Commission and Iraq and the terms of reference of the meetings held at Baghdad from 17 to 23 July 1998.

That relationship is that Iraq should declare in full and truthfully all relevant proscribed programmes, in this case, in the field of biological weapons and that the United Nations Special Commission should seek to verify those declarations. The recent meetings at Baghdad were to have operated under these basic principles.

To describe our inability to carry out our side of the work as a mere "gap" is to depart very far from the fact of the inadequacy of Iraq's past declarations, as identified on at least three occasions by independent groups of international experts.

The proposal you now make is similar to what you proposed, and we discussed, during my last visit to Baghdad, in June 1998. At that time, I made clear that while the biological weapons area might benefit from a change in methodology, the fundamental problem remained that of achieving a full and verifiable accounting of the Iraqi biological weapons programme to the satisfaction of qualified scientists. This is a matter of establishing facts, not of negotiation between two positions. Hence, during the June meeting, I agreed to our renewed, indeed fourth, effort by international experts, including those from countries which you specifically designated, to meet with their Iraqi counterparts in Baghdad to once again review Iraq's declarations. The duration of the meeting was to be determined by the team leader.

This meeting has now been completed and I look forward to receiving the team's report next week. If it proves to be "unsatisfactory", as you say it will, we will need to analyse why that is the case. It is premature, at this

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stage, to conclude that political level discussions, no matter of what duration, would correct a problem which has been long-standing, repeatedly addressed and has always rested on the failure of Iraq to provide concrete and verifiable technical information.

It continues to be our firm position that resolution of the biological weapons area can be accomplished with the provision of further documents and other verifiable information by Iraq, which Iraq possesses.

It is not the job of the Special Commission, as a technical subsidiary organ of the Security Council, to negotiate over what Iraq should or should not provide, or to intervene in the work and the assessments of experts.

Consequently, while we can discuss the status of the biological area and possible next steps which might be taken towards resolving the serious problem of Iraq's unwillingness to provide relevant materials, I cannot agree to the notion that the substance of this matter is one which can be resolved at the political level or by political negotiation, if the Security Council's concrete requirements are to be met.

Naturally, we can discuss future work and meetings both by experts and at our level. If Iraq were, in the interim or during my visit, to provide significant new information and documentation, I believe we would be able to agree upon the procedures for speedy, expert evaluation of such new materials. Discussion of such procedures could be accommodated during the time schedule already established for my visit to Baghdad. I assure you that I and my colleagues are ready to work intensively during that period.

(Signed) Richard BUTLER

Appendix V

[Original: Arabic]

Statement issued by Revolution Command Council and the Iraqi
Regional Command of the Arab Baath Socialist Party

In the Name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate

"To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged; - and verily, Allah is most powerful in their aid"

Great striving people,

Fellow members of the glorious Arab Nation,

Freemen and righteous men of the world,

For eight harsh years, Iraq has suffered unjust, oppressive and unparalleled sanctions which are unprecedented in recent history. As the whole world knows, these sanctions have led to the death of millions of Iraqi children, women and elderly persons, the deprivation of the proud people of Iraq of the most basic humanitarian needs, and the deterioration of the economic and scientific infrastructure built over decades through the efforts and resources of the Iraqis, denying them their legitimate right to development and progress and causing serious damage to the social structure of the country.

Iraq has accepted the resolutions of the Security Council and has implemented them over seven years of toil and hard work. This has entailed tremendous losses and unbearable costs, which were detailed in the statement issued on 30 July 1998. Iraq has fulfilled all the obligations imposed on it in the hope that this would lead initially to the lifting of the unjust sanctions through the implementation of paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and finally to the elimination of all other types of sanctions.

However, the United States of America has resorted to all ways and means to maintain the unjust sanctions in all their manifestations and in all areas of life and to obstruct and prevent any action by the Security Council that would recognize what Iraq has achieved in fulfilling the requirements of Security Council resolutions for the elimination of the sanctions. Foremost among the instruments used by the United States of America is the Special Commission. The United States of America controls the Commission's leadership, activities and mode of operation. Thus, the Commission has been turned into a disgraced instrument for implementing the criminal American policy against Iraq either by finding pretexts and fabricating crises with a view to maintaining the sanctions or by spying over Iraq and threatening its national security and sovereignty.

Throughout the past years, Iraq has raised this issue. Several crises have arisen, especially last year over the period which began in October 1997 and continued until 23 February 1998 when an agreement was concluded with the

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Secretary-General. But this agreement and all other efforts failed to rectify this situation, which remains unchanged. The Commission continues to fabricate false pretexts to perpetuate its work indefinitely. The United States of America blatantly and shamelessly continues to pursue its criminal policies of maintaining the sanctions in contravention to the text of the Security Council resolutions and the principles of international law.

Furthermore, since 1991 the United States of America has committed flagrant and gross violations of Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It continues to do so by imposing an illegal air siege against the northern and southern parts of Iraq. It openly declares its criminal schemes against Iraq by allocating funds to finance illegal activities aimed at intervening in Iraq's internal affairs to commit acts of sabotage and terrorism in the country.

Since 1 May 1998 we have been issuing candid, clear and sincere statements, in addition to some previous warnings during the last three months, against the consequences of such a position. We have also emphasized that the people of Iraq and its leadership cannot tolerate such an intransigent position of injustice, and called upon the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the international community to adopt a fair and firm position aimed at redressing this anomaly by putting an end to it and lifting the unjust sanctions imposed against the people of Iraq.

Yet these serious and sincere statements have remained unheeded, with the United States of America persisting in its policy and criminal schemes. For its part, the Special Commission has continued to implement such a policy, as may be seen from the proceedings of the last meeting between the representatives of the Commission and of Iraq when the Chairman of the Special Commission refused to endorse officially the substantive facts about Iraq's compliance with section (g) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and to inform the Security Council accordingly, even though these facts have been established and published for years.

We should also like to refer to the position of the United States of America when it rejected the proposals that were recently put before the Security Council to move the nuclear item from the status of disarmament to that of monitoring, even though this has been the situation since 1992 with the endorsement of a significant number of members of the Security Council.

In the light of the current circumstances, which confirm that Iraq will always be under siege regardless of what it does, and regardless of its fulfilment of the Security Council's requirements, the Command has reviewed the situation, recalling its message to the Security Council dated 1 May 1998, the speech delivered by President and Leader Saddam Hussein (may God be his guardian) on 17 July, and its statement issued on 30 July. In the light of the decisions taken by the National Assembly, the appeals issued and the positions taken by grass-roots and people's organizations, together with the unions, professional and popular associations and the political parties of the land, the Command has taken the following decisions to be conveyed to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

I - Since Iraq has fulfilled all the commitments required in section (C) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq calls upon the Security Council to apply paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) as a first step on the road leading to the complete and total lifting of sanctions.

II - Since the Special Commission, in its current composition, is neither objective nor fair, we request that the Security Council re-establish the Special Commission on the following basis:

- (i) Create a new executive bureau to lead and direct all the activities and functions of the Special Commission. It should be composed of an equal number of members who represent the nations that are permanent members of the Security Council. The chairmanship of the bureau should be on rotation basis. Iraq should participate as an observer in the bureau's work.
- (ii) Restructure the Commission's administrative units at its main office in New York and at its offices in both Bahrain and Baghdad according to the same principle.
- (iii) Remove the Commission's main office from New York to the United Nations Headquarters in either Geneva or Vienna so as to insulate it from the direct influence of the United States of America.

III - The Security Council and all its members, particularly the permanent members, should observe - legally, politically and in practice - the resolutions of the Council which stipulate that the sovereignty of Iraq and its legitimate rights should be respected. They should also abide by the Charter of the United Nations and the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Iraq and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 23 February 1998, and call to account those Council members who violate those principles, including the banning by force of flights over the northern and southern parts of Iraq by certain permanent members of the Council.

IV - Pending a move by the Security Council to take such just and legitimate steps, Iraq is totally suspending its cooperation with the Special Commission in its current form and with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

V - In expressing its good intentions and sincerely desiring that its decisions should be correctly interpreted and not tendentiously explained as non-compliance with Security Council resolutions or previous commitments, Iraq agrees that in the interim referred to in paragraph IV above, the monitoring activities according to the requirements of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) will continue, provided that the individuals responsible for monitoring tasks strictly respect the sovereignty and security of Iraq and the dignity of its people, as stipulated in the agreement of 23 February 1998 between Iraq and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Iraq reserves its right to expel any monitoring personnel who violate these legitimate obligations.

Our great people,

Sons of our glorious nation,

The brave members of our valiant armed forces,

Iraq was destined to be tested in its honour and principles in the name of the cause of your nation and the name of humanity.

We are sure that, as in the past, the people of Iraq will prove to the whole world that they are worthy of shouldering the honourable responsibility of gaining God's favour and carrying out man's duty to stand up to the oppressors when they perpetrate oppression and aggression. God is Greatest and He is able to grant victory and the despicable ones shall be driven away.
